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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The issue presented by this appeal is whether failure to 
make a single objection, when viewed in light of the entire 
record, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 4, 1985, the Defendant entered the ZCMI store at the 
Valley Fair Mall in West Valley City. He was seen by Katherine 
Loveless, secretary to the personnel manager. She described his 
attire as jogging shorts, athletic-type shirt, and a utility belt 
around his waist. When asked if she noticed anything peculiar 
about him, she said his jogging shorts were hiked up and that he 
was exposed. When asked to explain "exposed" she stated, "His 
private parts were showing for all the world to see." (TT p.36 
11 21-22.) This was apparently the case, as she later described 
young women in the credit line giggling and older ladies making 
an audible intake of break (breath). (TT p.42, 11 16-19.) 
Ms. Loveless was shown a picture of the Defendant which he 
said depicted his attire on May 4, 1985. This photograph was 
taken by Lyn Horton. (TT p.117, 11 9-16.) According to the 
Defendant, he had to deliberately arrange his clothing in order 
to make the bulge in his undershorts visible below the jogging 
shorts he wore in the photograph. (TT p.94, 11 1-12.) When Ms. 
Loveless compared what she saw in the photograph with what she 
saw on May 4, she stated the shorts were hiked up a lot more than 
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they were in the photograph. (TT p.38, 11 22-24.) This was 
before the Defendant came out of the men's room, when his shorts 
were hiked up even higher. (TT p.41 11 15-22.) 
Following Ms. Loveless1 testimony, the City called Stewart 
Poore. Mr. Poore testitifed he saw an astonished look on Ms. 
Loveless' face and that she told him a man had just walked by 
while partially exposed. (TT p.52, 11 3-10.) Mr. Poore also 
noticed the Defendant was exposed (Id., at 11 17-10.) Mr. Poore 
stated the Defendant's shorts were hiked up much higher than 
depicted in the photograph (TT p.53, 11 14-18), and noted the 
reaction of persons near the credit office (TT p.55, 11 13-16). 
The City next called Scott Longson. He also testified the 
Defendant was exposed. (TT p.76 11 3-8.) Following his 
testimony, the City called Ann Zupon. She stated what called her 
attention to the Defendant was the fact he was exposing himself. 
(TT p.73, 11 22-23.) She also testitifed people in the credit 
line saw him (TT p.74, 11 10), and that the problem was worse 
when he existed the men's room. (Id., at 11 14-18). The City 
called no further witnesses and rested. 
As its first witness, the defense called the Defendant, 
Kenneth Rislow. He stated he did not know any of his private 
parts were exposed to public view. (TT p. 89, 11 12-16.) 
On cross-examination, the Defendant stated the undershorts 
he was wearing had elastic around the leg which was very tight. 
(TT p.91, 11 16-18.) He stated that when a police officer 
approached him, he was not hanging out and did not have to adjust 
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himself. (TT p.91, 11 19-25; p. 92, 11 1-2.) It was his 
contention that he was never exposed, but people must have 
mistaken the shorts for his private parts. (TT p.92, 11 3-9.) 
Following the Defendant's testimony, several character 
witnesses testified as to their opinion of his moral character 
and the Defendant's reputation for truthfulness and honesty. The 
City called the Defendant's ex-wife in rebuttal. She testified 
that the Defendant had lied to her constantly (TT p. 121, 11 2-
12), and that he had registered a vehicle in New Jersey rather 
than pay Utah State taxes on it. (TT p.122, 11 7-12.) She also 
testified that he did not have a good reputation for telling the 
truth. (TT p.124, 11 6-9.) 
The City also recalled Ms. Loveless as a rebuttal witness. 
She was shown the undershorts the Defendant said he was wearing 
and asked if it were possible it was the shorts she had seen. 
She replied, "No way." (TT p.132, 11 2-5.) 
At the conclusion of rebuttal testimony and the reading of 
the instructions, the case was submitted to the jury. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue in this case is whether failure to object to an 
improper statement made by the Prosecutor during rebuttal 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The City submits that the lack of an objection was a 
tactical decision and that evidence of guilt was such that making 
the objection or the absence of the Prosecutor's statement would 
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not have made the outcome different. Therefore, it cannot be 
said Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective. 
ARGUMENT 
VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ENTIRE RECORD, THE 
LACK OF AN OBJECTION TO THE PROSECUTOR'S REBUTTAL 
ARGUMENT WAS A TACTICAL DECISION, AND THE VERDICT 
WAS NOT EFFECTED BY THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant bases his ineffective assistance argument on the 
lack of a single objection. This Court, in Codianna v Morris, 
660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), reaffirmed the test used to determine 
whether or not counsel has been ineffective. Two elements were 
identified, a subjective element and an objective element. The 
subjective element, willingness to identify with the interest of 
the accused, and the objective element, competency, are both 
necessary. Three factors are used to make the determination 
regarding the objective element. First, the Defendant must prove 
to the level of demonstrable reality that the representation is 
inadequate. Second, a legitimate exercise in judgment regarding 
strategy or tactics does not constitute ineffective assistance. 
Third, any deficiency must be prejudicial. That is, but for the 
error it must be reasonably likely there would have been a 
different result. Codianna, supra at 1109. 
The Defendant argues that he has met the first portion of 
the test because trial counsel did not object to the Prosecutor's 
statement during rebuttal• It is true that statement invited the 
jurors to consider matters they would not be justified in 
considering. An objection to the statement would have been 
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sustained. But, while the presence of the statement and the lack 
of an objection is a demonstrable reality, that is not sufficient 
to meet the test. As this Court stated in Codianna, "Counsel 
need not recognize and raise every possible objection in order to 
meet the compentence standard." Id. at 1113. It is the record 
as a whole which must be reviewed and establish the "demonstrable 
reality." State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah 1986) at 402-
403. 
The Defendant also argues the decision not to object could 
not have been a tactical decision. This is not the case. Trial 
counsel had observed the jury's reaction throughout the day. He 
was in the best position to assess the impact of the remark in 
context of the entire trial. As the district court noted in its 
first memorandum decision, "In view of the several objections of 
defense counsel (many of which were over-ruled) before the 
remarks of the prosecutor in closing argument, defense counsel 
may reasonably have determined that it was in his client's best 
interest not to object. (Tr., pp 120, 121, 122, 123, 127, 128, 
129, 130, 131). Defense counsel may have felt that the jury 
would have reacted adversely to the appellant if another 
objection was made and overruled. Furthermore, the failure to 
object may have been based upon defense counsel's reasonable hope 
that the jury would not focus on the remarks, and upon a 
reasonable belief that an objection would only focus their 
attention on matters which they should not consider. It appears, 
therefore, that defense counsel's decision not to object to the 
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Prosecutor's remarks was a legitimate exercise of professional 
judgment, and it is speculative whether or not such decision 
constituted an inadequate assistance by counsel•" Memorandum 
decision of Judge Judith Billings, attached as Appendix "A". 
The City submits it is proper to defer to the trial attorney 
(State v, Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984) at 1204. A copy of 
P.1204 is attached as Appendix "B". The City respectfully refers 
the Court to footnote 19. ), who had identified himself with the 
interests of his client, made numerous objections, actively 
cross-examined witnesses, called several witnesses on his clients 
behalf, and fully participated in the trial consistent with the 
ethics of the profession. The second prong has not been met. . 
The third prong of the test is whether or not a deficiency 
was prejudicial. The Codianna Court defined prejudice as an 
error without which there would be a reasonable likelihood the 
result would have been different. This is similar to the test 
which was set forth in State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 
422 (1973). 
The first part of the Valdez test is met in the case at bar. 
The prosecutor's remark did suggest something other than the 
Defendant's guilt was before the jury. The second part of the 
test, that the jurors were probably influenced, cannot be met. 
In State v» Andreason, supra this Court applied the test set 
forth in Valdez. In Andreason, this Court held because of the 
marginal nature of the evidence on intent, there was a reasonable 
likelihood the remark affected the jury. Andreason, supra at 403. 
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The instant case is distinguishable from Andreason. 
The evidence in Andreason was clearly circumstantial. No 
one was ever seen bypassing the electrial meters. No one was 
seen using tools in the new warehouse. No tests were ever made 
to determine if the outlets in the warehouse were receiving live 
voltage through the meter. Witnesses testified power was brought 
in by extension cord from outside sources. Outside lighting at 
another building was obtained through bypassing the meter, but no 
direct evidence was introduced on who had done that. A formula 
was used to compute the amount of power used without any direct 
evidence of use of the tools. Andreason, supra at 401. This 
Court concluded there was no direct evidence of guilt. Id. at 
403. 
The evidence of guilt in the instant case is much stronger. 
There can be no question that the Defendant was exposed. The 
evidence on that point was overwhelming. His genitals were seen 
by four store employees. Two of them testified people in the 
credit area also saw his genitals. 
The instant case is similar to Andreason in that in both the 
evidence on intent is circumstantial. Proof of intent usually is 
circumstantial. State v. Smith, 46 UAR 20 (1986) at 21. But 
unlike Andreason, the evidence in the case at bar is trong. The 
Defendant's own testimony clearly implies his intent. 
The Defendant identified a photograph of himself which he 
said depicted his appearance and dress the day he was arrested. 
He contended what the people in the store saw was his 
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undershorts. His testimony regarding the photograph bears 
directly on his intent• 
"A What are you asking, sir? 
Q That he saw the red shorts and though that that 
was you? 
A He saw the brownish-red shorts, sir— 
Q Brownish-red shorts. 
A —and thought that—and the very tight brownish-
red shorts and thought that was me. 
Q And in fact, sir, when you were—when you had this 
picture taken in Portland that we've marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, you were wearing those red 
shorts, weren't you? 
A That correct. 
Q And in fact, they're partially visible there, 
arent' they? 
A That's correct. 
Q And--
A Deliberately, sir. 
Q Deliberately? 
A That's correct. 
Q In other words, you had to make an effort to get 
your shorts out around so that part of you would hang 
out of there; isn't that correct? 
A It's correct, sir, that I was illustrating the 
point that they were visible from the shorts, that the 
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shorts were moved." (TT p.93 11 14-25; p. 94, ii 1-12. 
The Defendant's own testitmony was that he had to 
deliberately pull his jogging shorts up so the undershorts could 
be seen in the photograph. Both Ms. Loveless and Mr. Poore 
testified that the jogging shorts were hiked up much higher on 
May 4, 1985, than they were in the photograph. (TT p.38, 11 22-
24; p. 53, 11 14-18). Both Ms. Loveless and Ms. Zupon testitied 
that the jogging shorts were even higher when the Defendant 
exited the men's room. (TT p.41, 11 15-22; p. 74, 11 1-10). 
Even if it had been undershorts that everyone saw, there is only 
one logical conclusion to come to regarding how the jogging 
shorts came to be hiked up as high they were: The Defendant 
deliberately pulled them up. 
The Defendant's contention it was not his genitalia which 
were exposed is simply not credible. In contrast to the 
testimony that he was exposed, the Defendant testified he did not 
know he was exposed. (TT p.89, 11 12-16). He also stated that 
the undershorts he claimed to have worn were very tight. (TT 
p.91, 11 16-18' p. 92 1 9). Surely the Defendant would have 
known if his private parts were outside of those tight shorts. 
Ms. Loveless testified there was "no-way" it was the shorts she 
had seen. (TT p. 132, 11 2-5). The jury properly concluded that 
he was exposed and that he deliberately exposed himself. 
Defendant also argues negative character evidence was 
improperly introduced by the City during rebuttal. The City 
submits the evidence that the Defendant lied to his former wife 
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and registered a vehicle in New Jersey to avoid paying Utah 
Taxes. (TT p.121, 11 2-12; p. 122, 11 7-12) was properly 
received. 
In State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350 (Utah 1985) this Court held 
the introduction of specific instances of conduct as part of 
Defendant's case in chief was prohibited by the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Whether or not specific instances of conduct would be 
proper as rebuttal evidence was not addressed in Miller. Prior 
to the present rules taking effect, this Court ruled that 
specific instances of conduct were appropriate rebuttal evidence. 
State v. Green, 578 P. 2d 512 (Utah 1978) at 514. The City 
submits that under the present rules, (Rule 404 and 405) there 
are instances where specific instances of conduct are proper 
rebuttal. 
In United States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735 (1980), (attached 
as Appendix "E") the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that 
Rule 404(b) made extrinsic acts evidence inadmissible solely to 
prove the Defendant is a bad character likely to commit the crime 
charged. They also stated such acts were admissible for other 
purposes, such as those set forth by the rule, but that the list 
was illustrative, not exclusive. Id., at 737. 
The Johnson Court dealt with facts somewhat like those in 
the case at bar. Johnson's defense in her income tax evasion 
trial was inadvertance. She testified to that end and brought in 
several local witnesses who testified to her truthfulness, 
honesty and compassion, as well as the busy nature of her medical 
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practice. Id., at 736 
To rebut this evidence, the government called an auditor who 
testified at length about his investigation of her books. He 
stated her books showed Johnson reported four times as many 
services per patient as other Virginia doctors, and that she had 
billed for services she had not performed. The Johnson Court 
held this testimony was admissible. Id., at 736, 737. 
After commenting on the discretion granted a trial judge 
under Rule 404(b), the Court noted, 
"Particularly where, as here, a defendant in 
a criminal case by her own testimony and that 
of others has deliberately sought as the 
primary means of defense to depict herself as 
one who essential philosophy and habitual 
conduct in life is completely at odds with 
the possession of a state of mind requisite 
to guilt of the offense charged, that 
defendant may have been considered in effect 
to have forfeited any protection that the 
first sentence of the Rule might otherwise 
have provided against the type of "other act" 
evidence here challenged." 
Johnson, supra at 737, 738 
The City submits the Defendant's evidence raised two issues: 
1) his moral character, that is, that his philosophy and habitual 
conduct were at odds with exposing himself; and 2) his 
credibility as a witness. The City suggest that by so doing, he 
placed himself outside the protection afforded him in Rule 404. 
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled on this issue. 
In United States v. Gustafson, 728 F.2d 1078 (1984), (attached as 
Appendix "D") they addressed the question of admission of other 
wrongs or acts. They stated that Rule 404(b) is one of inclusion 
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allowing admission of other crimes, wrongs or acts relevant to an 
issue in the trial. They stated that the trial court has broad 
discretion in deciding whether or not to admit such evidence and 
would only be reversed when it is clear such evidence has no 
bearing on any of the issues involved in the trial. (Id., at 
1083). A review of the record makes it clear the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence haring on the 
issues raised by the Defendant. 
The Defendant placed his moral character and his character 
for truthfulness and veracity in issue by testifying and calling 
character witnesses. When the prosecutor asked Mrs. Richards, 
the Defendant's ex-wife, if he had lied to her, defense counsel 
objected. The court overruled the objection, stating, "I think 
in light of the character evidence that's been received, that 
this is proper rebuttal." (TT p. 121, 11 7-8.) Mrs. Richards 
stated that he had lied on numerous occasions, that he had 
registered a vehicle in New Jersey to avoid paying Utah State 
taxes on it, and that he had a poor reputation for truthfulness 
and veracity. (TT pp. 121-124.) The trial Court properly 
allowed rebuttal evidence consisting of relevant specific 
instances of conduct. The City submits under the standards of 
Green, Johnson and Gustafson, supra, there was no abuse of 
discretion. 
When the entire record and the circumstances of the case are 
considered, it is clear the remarks of the prosecutor did not 
effect the verdict. Evidence that the Defendant was exposed was 
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overwhelming. The evidence also showed there was only one way 
the Defendant's shorts could have been high enough to facilitate 
the exposure: he did it deliberately. Even though an improper 
argument was made, and assuming improper rebuttal testimony was 
admitted, the evidence was such that it is not reasonably likely 
the result would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the City submits that trial counsel 
was effective and competent and respectfully moves this Court to 
affirm the conviction and remand the case to the circuit court. 
DATED this day of December, 1986. 
R. SPENCER ROBINSON 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
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APPENDIX "A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff /Respondent, : CIVIL NO. CRA-86-9 
vs. : 
KENNETH H. RISLOW, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
This is an appeal from the Fifth Circuit Court, West Valley 
Department from a conviction, by jury, with the Honorable Tyrone 
E. Medley presiding, for the offense of lewdness, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 13-9-702 of the West Valley 
Revised Ordinances. Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction 
and a new trial. This Court, having reviewed the record and 
the Memoranda submitted by counsel for both parties, enters 
its Memorandum Decision in this case, as follows. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The appellant was charged in West Valley City with the 
offense of lewdness, a Class B Misdemeanor. The incident occurred 
at the ZCMI department store located at the Valley Fair Mall 
in West Valley City. West Valley City claimed that the defendant 
entered the store wearing jogging shorts, hiked up considerably 
to one side, and that appellantfs genitalia were fully and obviously 
exposed to all present. The City alleged that the appellant 
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entered the store, stood for a few moments in a line at the 
credit department, then walked through the toy department, returned 
to the credit department area, leaned up against a bus schedule 
stand for a few moments, and then went into the restroom. Upon 
leaving the restroom, there was testimony that the appellant1 s 
exposure was worse than it had been prior to entering the restroom. 
Appellant, on the other hand, claims that the exposure did not 
occur at all, that he was wearing tight-fitting undershorts 
under his jogging shorts, and that the witnesses testifying 
as to his exposure must have been mistaken as to what they saw. 
At the trial of this matter, the appellant called three 
character witnesses to testify as to his general good character 
and truthfulness. In rebuttal, the prosecutor called the appellantf s 
ex-wife. During the course of the direct examination of appellant's 
ex-wife, the prosecutor asked questions regarding specific instances 
of the appellant's conduct bearing on his character and truthful-
ness. Over the objection of appellantfs counsel, the trial 
court allowed appellant1s ex-wife to testify that appellant 
had lied to her on several occasions, that on one specific occasion 
the defendant had registered an automobile in New Jersey in 
order to avoid the Utah State taxes, and that he was somewhat 
recalcitrant regarding the payment of income taxes during their 
marriage. (Tr. , pp 121-22) • Further testimony of appellantfs 
ex-wife to the effect that he had physically hurt her, and that 
15 
WEST VALLEY V. RISLOW PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
people were afraid of him was stricken, and the jury was instructed 
to disregard such testimony. (Tr., pp 122-24). Appellant contends 
that the court erred in allowing testimony of specific instances 
bearing on the appellant's character• Respondents, however, 
argue that such evidence was proper where the appellant's character 
was brought into issue by the appellant calling character witnesses 
in his own behalf. 
Appellant further contends that the court also erred in 
allowing the following remarks by the prosecutor in his closing 
argument: 
Counsel finally says that hefs [appellant] 
guilty of being a slop, not lewdness. Ifm 
sorry, it's more than that. It's much more 
than that. Do you want people walking into 
the stores where you shop, dressed in that 
fashion, dangling their genitalia and you're 
going to find them not guilty? See, that 
presumption of innocence just went out the 
window. It's now time for you to decide 
this case. If you want these people walking 
around in your stores where you shop, then 
you're going to find him not guilty. If 
you want to put a stop to it, you're going 
to find him guilty. You raised your hand, 
an obligation, you swore that you would 
well and truly try this case. I am asking 
you to do what you agreed to do. (Tr., 
P 173). 
In addition to claiming error in allowing these remarks, appellant 
contends that the failure of defense counsel at trial to object 
to the prosecutor's statements amounted to a denial of appellant's 
right to effective assistance of counsel. 
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Appellant raises three issues on this appeal: (1) Did 
the Circuit Court err in allowing the prosecutor to introduce 
evidence of specific conduct and/or other wrongs by appellant 
in order to show his bad character?; (2) Was appellant denied 
his right to a fair trial because of alleged improper remarks 
in his closing argument?; and (3) Was he denied his rights under 
state and federal law to effective assistance of counsel? 
II. OPINION 
A. Evidence of Specific Instances. 
The admissibility of character evidence at trial is controlled 
by Rules 4 04 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 404 
provides for the conditions under which evidence of a person's 
character may be received in evidence. 
Evidence of a person's character or 
a trait of his character is not admissible 
for the purpose of proving that he acted 
in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence 
of a pertinent trait of his character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same. . . • 
It is clear that the prosecution may properly offer evidence 
as to the character of the accused in order to rebut character 
evidence offered by the accused on his own behalf. The defendant 
placed his moral character and his character for truthfulness 
and veracity in issue when he called character witnesses to 
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testify in his behalf. The appellant further opened the door 
to allow the prosecution to offer evidence as to appellant's 
character when the appellant took the stand to testify as a 
witness. Rule 608, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Although the prosecution was free to offer evidence as 
to the appellant's character, the admissibility of such evidence 
was not without limit. Rule 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides that: 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all 
cases in which evidence of character or 
trait of character of a person is admissible, 
proof may be made by testimony as to the 
reputation or by testimony in the form of 
an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry 
is allowable into relevant specific instances 
of conduct. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. 
In cases in which character or a trait of 
character of a person is an essential element 
of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may 
also be made of specific instances of his 
conduct. 
The above language controls the methods in which the prosecution 
in this case could properly offer evidence of the appellant's 
character. Evidence of specific instances of appellant's conduct 
was properly admissible only on cross-examination or in the 
event that the appellant's character was an essential element 
of the charge of lewdness. 
In State v. Miller, 21 Utah Adv. Rpt. 8 (10/29/85), the 
Utah Supreme Court discussed the operation of Rules 404 and 
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405. In that case, the defendant in a criminal trial offered 
evidence of specific instances regarding his good character. 
The trial court, however, refused to allow such evidence. On 
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court stated that although character 
evidence may be admissible under Rule 404, counsel seeking to 
offer such evidence must deal with the restrictions set forth 
in Rule 405. Id. at 10. As seen above, Rule 405 provides that 
specific instances of conduct may only be admitted into evidence 
during cross-examination or where the person's character is 
an essential element of the charge against him. Since the evidence 
sought to be offered by the defendant was not on cross-examination, 
and since the defendant's character was not Man element of the 
crime of sexually abusing a child," the Supreme Court held that 
the exclusion of specific instances of conduct was proper under 
Rule 405. 
Respondent relies upon language found in State v. Green, 
578 P.2d 512 (Utah 1978). The Green case, however, was written 
before the adoption of Rules 4 04 and 405 of the current Utah 
Rules of Evidence. In view of this fact, this Court relies 
upon the Utah Supreme Court1 s interpretation of the operation 
of Rules 404 and 405 as set forth in State v. Miller. 21 Utah 
Adv. Rpt. 8 (10/29/85). 
In the instant case, the evidence and testimony objected 
to by respondents was brought out on direct testimony of the 
19 
WEST VALLEY V. RISLOW PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
prosecution's rebuttal witness. (Tr., pp 119-24). The character 
of the appellant was not an essential element in proving the 
crime of lewdness, West Valley Revised Ordinances, Section 13-9-702, 
nor was it an "essential element" of appellant's defenses that 
the incident never occurred and he lacked the requisite intent. 
Evidence of appellant's character is not required to establish 
these defenses. In view of these circumstances, the trial court 
erred in admitting evidence of specific instances of appellant's 
prior conduct, although evidence and testimony in the form of 
opinion and reputation was properly admissible. State v. Miller, 
21 Utah Adv. Rpt. 8 (10/29/85). 
In order for the trial court's error in admitting evidence 
of specific instances of appellant's prior conduct to warrant 
reversal of the conviction, the trial court's error must have 
been prejudicial error. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
an error of the trial court is prejudicial error and requires 
reversal if, in the absence of such error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that there would have been a different result. State 
v. Kosda. 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975); State v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 
1322 (Utah 1974). Excluding all evidence regarding specific 
instances of appellant's conduct, the jury still had before 
it testimony from four employees of the store where the incident 
occurred that the defendant was fully exposed, that such exposure 
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was obvious and blatant, and that others in the store noticed 
appellants situation. (Tr., pp 36, 41, 47, 52, 67, 73, 74). 
Appellant testified that the exposure of his genitalia 
never occurred, and that he was wearing tight-fitting undershorts 
underneath his jogging shorts. (Tr., pp 89-92). One of the 
store employees, however, testified that there was "no way" 
the appellant was wearing the tight-fitting undershorts claimed, 
or that she was mistaken as to what she saw. (Tr., p 132). 
Testimony of the store employees was to the effect that the 
appellant entered the store, and that he was fully and obviously 
exposed to all present. (Tr., pp 36, 41, 47, 52, 67, 73, 74). 
The employees testified that the appellant stood in a line in 
front of the credit department for a few minutes, walked into 
the toy department for a few minutes, and then went into the 
restroom. (Tr., pp 39, 40, 41). Upon exiting the restroom, 
the employees testified that the condition of appellants exposure 
was worse than it had been previously. (Tr., pp 41, 74) . Addition-
ally, there was testimony by the appellant himself, that he 
would have had to deliberately hike up his shorts in order to 
get them into the situation where he was exposed to the extent 
testified to by the store employees. (Tr., pp 93-94). Although 
the appellant claimed that he was at no time exposed while in 
the store, there is substantial competent evidence in the record 
supporting appellants conviction for the crime of lewdness, 
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and this Court is not persuaded that the improper admission 
of the specific instances had any impact on the jury, and can 
not say that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result 
would have been different. 
B. Prosecutor's Closing Remarks. 
Appellants second claim of error is that the appellant 
was denied his right to a fair trial due to remarks made by 
the prosecutor in his closing argument. In State v. Valdez. 
513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court provided a 
two prong test in determining whether improper remarks in closing 
argument requires reversal of a conviction. 
[T]he test of whether the remarks made by 
counsel are so objectionable as to merit 
a reversal in a criminal case is, did the 
remarks call to the attention of the jurors 
matters which they would not be justified 
in considering in determining their verdict, 
and were they, under the circumstances of 
the case, probably influenced by those remarks. 
Id. at 426. 
This Court must first determine whether or not the closing 
argument called to the attention of the jurors matters which 
they could not properly consider in determining the guilt or 
innocence of the apppellant, and then under the circumstances 
of the case whether or not the jurors were influenced by such 
remarks. 
In closing argument, the prosecutor made the following 
statement: 
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Counsel finally says that he's [appellant] 
guilty of being a slop, not lewdness. I1*! 
sorry, it's more than that. It's much more 
than that. Do you want people walking into 
the stores where you shop, dressed in that 
fashion, dangling their genitalia and you're 
going to find them not guilty? See, that 
presumption of innocence just went out the 
window. It's now time for you to decide 
this case. If you want these people walking 
around in your stores where you shop, then 
you're going to find him not guilty. If 
you want to put a stop to it, you're going 
to find him guilty. You raised your hand, 
an obligation, you swore that you would 
well and truly try this case. I am asking 
you to do what you agreed to do. (Tr. , 
p 173). 
It should be noted, that earlier in his closing remarks, 
the prosecutor stressed to the jury that if they were not convinced 
of the defendant's guilt, that they should find him not guilty, 
and that they could be proud of that decision and hold their 
heads high with respect to their performance as jurors. (Tr., 
p 156) . Standing alone, however, the remarks of the prosecutor 
quoted above might well have been interpreted by the jurors 
to the effect that they had a duty to look beyond the appellant's 
guilt or innocence and deal generally with the problem of lewdness 
in public places. It is possible that the jurors would consider, 
in addition to the facts regarding the appellant's guilt or 
innocence, that a guilty verdict would operate generally to 
reduce the problem of lewdness in public places. Such considerations 
by the jury would be clearly outside the scope of the jurors' 
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proper considerations, and would be improper. The remarks made 
by the prosecutor with regard to stopping "these people11 from 
lewdness in public places were improper. 
In determining whether or not such remarks warrant reversal 
of appellant's conviction, this Court must look to the second 
prong of the Valdez test regarding the probable influence of 
such remarks on the jury. The Utah Supreme Court cases cited 
by the appellant regarding improper remarks by counsel in closing 
argument, indicate that improper remarks by a prosecutor in 
closing argument will not warrant reversal of a conviction where 
there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the convic-
tion. State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); State v. Troy, 
688 P. 2d 483 (Utah 1983); State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah 
1983). In Valdez. the court stated that ,fif proof of defendant's 
guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not be 
presumed prejudicial." (Quoting State v. Seeaer. 4 ore.App. 336, 
479 P.2d 240 (1971)). In State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court held that although the prosecutor's 
remarks were "clearly improper" the jury was probably not influenced 
by the remarks in view of substantial evidence of the defendants 
guilt. As discussed above, the record in the instant case contained 
substantial competent evidence supporting the lewdness conviction 
and this Court finds that it is unlikely that the result would 
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have been different in the absence of the prosecutor's improper 
remarks, and that such remarks, therefore, were not prejudicial, 
C. Adequate Assistance of Counsel. 
Finally, appellant argues that his conviction should be 
reversed on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel because defense counsel at trial failed to object 
to the improper remarks of the prosecutor in closing argument. 
In Strickland v. Washington, U.S. , 104 Sup.Ct. 2052, 
25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth the standard 
in determining whether or not a conviction should be reversed 
on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the results of the 
proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. 
In view of the substantial evidence in the record supporting 
the appellant's lewdness conviction, it appears highly unlikely 
that the result would have been different had the defense counsel 
objected to defendant's remarks, and that appellant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, therefore, fails under the Strickland 
standard. In fact, in view of the several overruled objections 
of defense counsel shortly prior to the prosecutor's closing 
remarks, a further objection at the time of the prosecutor's 
remarks may possibly have done more harm than good. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 
1101 (Utah 1983), established a more comprehensive standard 
to aid in determining whether or not a conviction should be 
set aside or reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The court stated: 
(1) The burden of establishing inadequate 
representation is on the defendant Mand 
proof of such must be a demonstrable reality, 
and not a speculative matter." 
(2) A lawyer's ,flegitimate exercise 
of judgment: in the choice of trial strategy 
or tactics that did not produce the anticipated 
result does not constitute ineffective assistance 
of counsel." 
(3) It must appear that any deficiency 
in the performance of counsel was prejudicial. 
In this context, prejudice means that without 
counsel's error there was a "reasonable 
likelihood that there would have been a 
different result." 
Counsel for the appellant must satisfy all three of the above 
requirements in order to succeed in setting aside or reversing 
his conviction. 
Under the first two requirements of the Codianna standard, 
the appellant must show that the failure to object to the prosecu-
tor's remarks was as "a demonstrable reality" inadequate and 
unprofessional representation and further that it was not a 
legitimate exercise of judgment or choice of trial strategy. 
Under the circumstances of the instant case, it does not appear 
that the appellant has met these two tests. In view of the 
several objections of defense counsel (many of which were overruled) 
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before the remarks of the prosecutor in closing argument, defense 
counsel may reasonably have determined that it was in his client's 
best interest not to object. (Tr., pp 120, 121, 122, 123, 127, 
128, 129, 130, 131). Defense counsel may have felt that the 
jury would have reacted adversely to the appellant if another 
objection was made and overruled. Furthermore, the failure 
to object may have been based upon defense counsel's reasonable 
hopes that the jury would not focus on the remarks, and upon 
a reasonable belief that an objection would only focus their 
attention on matters which they should not consider. It appears, 
therefore, that defense counsel's decision not to object to 
the prosecutor's remarks was a legitimate exercise of professional 
judgment, and it is speculative whether or not such decision 
constituted an inadequate assistance by counsel. 
The third prong of the Codianna standard, requires that 
even if defense counsel was inadequate and unprofessional in 
his representation of the appellant, appellant's conviction 
will not be disturbed unless it is shown that such ineffective 
assistance of counsel was prejudicial to the appellant. As 
stated above, the standard in determining whether or not error 
in the trial court is prejudicial is whether or not there is 
a reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different 
result in the absence of the error. As discussed above, it 
does not appear that the appellant was prejudiced by the comment 
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by the prosecutor in closing remarks regarding the stopping 
of "these people" from engaging in lewd behavior in public places 
in view of the substantial competent evidence in the record 
supporting the appellants lewdness conviction. This is especially 
true when the prosecutor's comments objected to by appellant 
are placed into context with the rest of the prosecutor's closing 
remarks. 
In his closing remarks, the prosecutor stressed to the 
jury that if they were not convinced by the evidence admitted 
at the trial that the defendant was guilty, then the jurors 
were duty bound to find the defendant not guilty, and that they 
could thereafter be proud of their decision and of their conduct 
as jurors. (Tr., p 156). The prosecutor also stressed to the 
jury that this case was obviously more important to the defendant 
than to the City, stating that this is one case in a thousand 
for the City, but that this was the defendant's life that was 
on trial. (Tr., p 156). 
Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jurors that 
the comments and remarks of counsel were not evidence, and that 
their decision could only be based upon evidence accepted by 
the court. (Tr., p 144-155). The jury was also instructed 
that they must presume the innocence of the appellant until 
they were convinced otherwise by evidence received by the court. 
(Tr., p 144-155). 
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This Court finds that it is unlikely that the jury was 
influenced by the remarks of the prosecutor, and further finds 
that it is unlikely that the jury's verdict would have been 
different in the absence of such remarks or in the presence 
of an objection by defense counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court finds that the admission of evidence regarding 
specific instances of the appellant's conduct, and the comments 
by the prosecutor in his closing remarks were improper. The 
Court further finds, however, that in the absence of such evidence 
and remarks, it is unlikely that the jury's resulting verdict 
would have been different, and that the appellant, therefore, 
was not prejudiced thereby. The appellant's lewdness conviction 
is hereby affirmed. 
Dated this 2(1 dav of April, 1986. 
JUDITH "M. BILLINGS (/ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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showing that counsel made errors so ser-
ious that counsel was not functioning as 
the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient* 
performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's er-
rors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. 
Id.—ILS.at^ , 104 S.Ct at 2064. The 
level of judicial scrutiny which defense 
counsel's performance must withstand is 
highly deferential." Id. — U.S. at , 
104 S.Ct at 2065. 
[37] Defendants challenge counsel's as-
sistance in several respects. First, they 
assert that defense counsel did not make 
his opening statement until the opening of 
defendants' case in chief and then, defend-
ants claim, the statement was defective 
such that they were "denied the opportuni-
ty to present the jury with an intelligent, 
cohesive description of their case." De-
fendants further claim that defense coun-
sel's closing statement was defective. De-
fendants do not explain why the timing of 
the-opening statement was not merely a 
'legitimate exercise of judgment" State 
v. McNicol, 554 P.2d at 205. As to the 
quality of the opening and closing state 
ments, defendants do not even attempt to 
demonstrate how counsel's representation 
in this regard "fell below an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness." Strickland, — 
U.S. at , 104 S.Ct at 2065. "The object 
of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade 
counsel's performance." Id. —- U.S. at 
, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. The record does 
not reveal and defendants make no show-
ing that the opening and closing state-
19. The Strickland court explained its reasoning: 
It is all too tempting for a defendant to sec-
ond-guess counsel's assistance after convic-
tion or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy 
for a court, examining counsel's defense after 
it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 
particular act or omission of counsel was un-
reasonable. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 VS. 107, 
133-134, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1574-1575, 71 
L.£d.2d 783 (1982). A fair assessment of at-
torney performance requires that every effort 
be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
ments support a claim of ineffectiveness of 
counsel. 
Defendants also claim that trial counsel's 
failure to move to strike the testimony of 
four State witnesses reflects ineffective as-
sistance of counsel. Defendants allege 
that the witnesses, Craig Duvall, Christine 
Swanson, Iinia Teniaki, and Kelly Powers, 
"offered no probative testimony as to the 
truth of the allegations." Defendants are 
not specific regarding any objections, the 
grounds for the proposed motion to strike, 
or whether it was likely the trial court 
would have granted such a request Fur-
thermore, as a result of repeated objections 
to the witnesses' testimony by defense 
counsel, nothing therein may be remotely 
characterized as harmful or prejudicial to 
the defense. 
Defendants next argue that trial counsel 
was ineffective when he attempted to im-
peach a State witness based on prior incon-
sistent statements from a preliminary hear-
ing without requesting transcripts from the 
hearing. As noted previously, defendants 
have not provided those transcripts as part 
of the record on appeal. Nor do defend-
ants explain the content of the inconsistent 
statements and how they would have been 
helpful. Without more, we cannot consider 
whether this point of error represents inef-
fective assistance of counsel. 
Defendants also challenge the trial coun-
sel's assistance with respect to his failure 
to elicit character witness testimony. The 
record indicates the contrary. Despite re-
peated objections, defense counsel 
managed to elicit much positive testimony 
from the character witnesses. We there-
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate 
the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time. Because of the difficulties inherent in 
making the evaluation, a court must indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable pro-
fessional assistance; that is the defendant 
must overcome the presumption that, under 
the circumstances, the challenged action 
"might be considered sound trial strategy." 
See Michel v. New York, supra, 350 VS. 91 at 
101, 76 S.Ct. 158 at 164, 100 L.Ed. «3. 
ULt — VS. at . 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66. 
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APPENDIX "C" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY CITY, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : CIVIL NO. CRA-86-9 
vs. : 
KENNETH H. RISLOW, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
The Court on request of counsel for the defendant heard 
oral argument on this appeal from the Fifth Circuit Court, West 
Valley Department on May 19, 1986. The plaintiff was represented 
by Spencer Robinson, Assistant City Attorney, and the defendant 
by Ronald Yengich, Esq. The Court agreed to reconsider its 
Memorandum Decision issued on April 28, 1986, as counsel for 
the defendant had not been given an opportunity to respond by 
way of written Memoranda or oral argument to the City's Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities. 
On rehearing the defendant argues that this case should 
be governed by State of Utah v. Derrick Andreason. No. 20616, 
Filed May 6, 1986, Utah Supreme Court. The defendant urges 
that an essential element of the crime of which the defendant 
was convicted is intent: that under circumstances where the 
defendant should have had knowledge that he was exposed, that 
he knowingly exposed himself. Counsel states that the evidence 
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as to the defendant's intent was circumstantial, and was conflicting, 
and thus that this is exactly the circumstance where the prosecutorf s 
improper closing argument was probably instrumental in the jury's 
finding of guilt. The Court in Andreason. supra# states: 
When the evidence in the record is circumstantial 
or sufficiently conflicting, jurors are 
more likely influenced by improper argument. 
In such cases they are more susceptible 
to the suggestion that factors other than 
the evidence before them should determine 
a defendant's guilt or innocence. Considering 
all the facts and circumstances of this 
case, we conclude that the jury was probably 
influenced by the improper closing remarks 
in view of the highly marginal nature of 
any evidence of criminal intent or knowledge 
on the part of the defendant, a reasonable 
likelihood exists that in the absence of 
the prosecutor's prejudicial argument, there 
might have been a different result. 
Id. at page 4. 
The Court has reviewed again the transcript of the hearing, 
and agrees that the evidence on intent was conflicting and circum-
stantial. The Court has already held in the prior Memorandum 
Decision that the prosecutor's remarks during closing statement 
were improper. However, it is undisputed that counsel for the 
defendant did not object to these remarks at the time of trial. 
Therefore, in order to find a reversal, this Court would have 
to find that trial counsel's failure to object to the improper 
statement of the prosecutor resulted in inadequate assistance 
of counsel. As stated in the Court's prior Memorandum Decision, 
this Court cannot agree with that premise. Therefore, even 
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though if a proper objection had been made, this Court may have 
had grounds for reversal, the Court does not believe that the 
failure to make such an objection rises to the level of inadequate 
representation of counsel. As more fully discussed at pp. 12-16 
of the Court's prior Memorandum Decision, defense counsel's 
decision not to object to the prosecutor's remarks was a legitimate 
exercise of professional judgment and not inadequate representation. 
Based upon the above, the Court reaffirms its affirmance 
of the conviction of the defendant. 
Dated this 29th day of May, 1986. 
JUDITH/M.^BILLINGS / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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fraud, and conspiracy. One defendant 
agreed, pursuant to a plea bargain, to plead 
to one count of mail fraud and testify on 
behalf of the Government. The United 
States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota, Edward J. Devitt, J., granted 
judgments of acquittal to two defendants, 
^fter a jury verdict, two defendants were 
convicted of all counts, and one defendant 
was convicted of 11 counts. Appeal was 
taken. The Court of Appeals, Ross, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) letter of bank examin-
er, which was introduced to show that de-
fendants had knowledge and notice that 
suspicious "check floating" activity had oc-
curred at bank and that it was deemed 
misapplication of funds by bank examiners, 
was properly introduced under rule pertain-
ing to "other crimes" evidence; (2) fact 
that codefendants had agreed after trial to 
give information to Government in ex-
change for a more lenient sentence did not 
constitute newly discovered evidence enti-
tling one of the defendants to a new trial; 
and (3) trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in refusing to rule in advance on de-
fendant's motion in limine requesting that 
Government not be allowed to broach de-
fendant's second indictment in cross-exami-
nation of acquitted codefendant who de-
fendant wished to call to testify for the 
defense. 
asing black representation; and that his 
retaries did not like him. 
'he district court rejected appellant's 
m stating: 
Vhat Plaintiff seems not to realize is 
hat it is a trait of human nature that 
ome people instinctively resent a situa-
ion wherein a person "from the outside" 
i brought in, given a full associate prfe 
essorship, moved "ahead" of severaMac-
Ity members already employed at the 
Jniversity, and given arr unusual twelve-
lonth contract rather than the usual 
ine-month contract, regardless of the 
ace of the person involved. 
F.Supp. at 124. The court determined 
t the work environment was not so pol-
id with discrimination as to substantially 
ect appellant's employment, and that the 
lor animosity which existed toward Dr. 
liver was not grounded in race. See 
»iddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 
., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.1977). This find-
is not clearly erroneous. See Wagh, 
>ra, 705 F.2d at 1021. 
Ve have studied appellant's remaining 
;uments and find them to be without 
rit. Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
nt of the district court. 
[? |KCTNUIM£RSVSTEII> 
MTED STATES of America, Appellee, 
v. 
Deil Otto GUSTAFSON, Appellant. 
tITED STATES of America, Appellee, 
v. 
Ralph Edwin BRUINS, Appellant 
Nos. 83-1631, 83-1653. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eighth Circuit. 
Submitted Dec. 12, 1983. 
Decided Feb. 29, 1984. 
Rehearing Denied March 30,1984. 
Six defendants were indicted for false 
try on bank records, mail fraud, wire 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <*=> 369.2(1) 
Requirements which must be met for 
"other crimes" evidence to be admissible 
under rule of evidence are: (1) a material 
issue on which other crimes evidence may 
be admissible has been raised; (2) proffered 
evidence is relevant to the issue; and (3) 
evidence of the other crimes is clear and 
convincing. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
2. Criminal Law <*=»371(1), 372(1) 
To be admissible on such issues as in-
tent, knowledge, or plan, "other crimes" 
UNITED STATES 
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evidence must relate to wrongdoing similar 
in kind and reasonably close in time to the 
charge at trial. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 
404(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Criminal Law ** 369.1 
Evidence admissible under rule of evi-
dence pertaining to other crimes may be 
excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by danger of unfair prej-
udice. Fed.Rules Evid.Rules 403, 404(b), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
4. Criminal Law <»=» 369.2(1) 
Rule pertaining to admission of "other 
crimes" evidence is one of inclusion because 
it allows admission of evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts relevant to an issue 
in the trial, unless it tends only to prove 
criminal disposition. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 
404(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
5. Criminal Law *-369.2(1), 1153(1) 
Trial court is vested with broad discre-
tion in deciding whether to admit wrongful 
act evidence, and decision to admit such 
evidence will only be reversed when it is 
clear that questioned evidence has no bear-
ing upon any of the issues involved at trial. 
Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
6. Criminal Law <t=>369.2(3) 
Letter of bank examiner to bank board 
of directors, which was introduced at trial 
as evidence which tended to show that de-
fendants had knowledge and notice that 
suspicious "floating" activity had occurred 
at bank and was deemed a misapplication of 
funds by bank examiners, was properly in-
troduced in prosecution for false entry on 
bank records, notwithstanding claim that it 
was introduced only to show that defend-
ants had propensity toward criminal behav-
ior, since letter was relevant to rebut de-
fense claim that defendants were innocent 
because they relied on subordinates to han-
dle such day-to-day transactions. Fed. 
Rules Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.; 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1005. 
7. Criminal Law «»338(1) 
Evidence is relevant when it serves to 
rebut defense that a person has justifiably 
v. GUSTAFSON 1079 
1078 (ISM) 
relied upon subordinates to handle business 
matters. 
8. Criminal Law *»374 
With regard to requirement that in or-
der to be admissible, evidence of "other 
crimes" must be clear and convincing, prof-
fered evidence cannot be admitted if it is of 
vague and uncertain character. Fed.Rules 
Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
9. Criminal Law «=»374 
In order to be admissible under clear 
and convincing standard, prior conduct can-
not be equally consistent with an innocent 
explanation. Fed.Rules Evid.Rule 404(b), 
28 U.S.C.A. 
10. Criminal Law «=* 369.2(3) 
Evidence of prior conduct relating to 
improper check "float" which occurred 
when bank credited defendant's account 
with check prior to its collection was admis-
sible in prosecution for false entry on bank 
records, since evidence was clear and con-
vincing, it was related to wrongdoing simi-
lar in kind and reasonably close in time to 
charge at trial, and its probative value sub-
stantially outweighed the danger of unfair 
prejudice. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1005; Fed.Rules 
Evid.Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
11. Criminal Law *=» 673(5) 
A limiting instruction telling jury not 
to consider evidence of other acts as sub-
stantive proof but only as proof of notice or 
knowledge of a prior incident diminishes 
danger of any unfair prejudice arising from 
admission of evidence of other acts. 
12. Criminal Law «=> 938(1) 
Before motion for new trial on ground 
of newly discovered evidence can be grant-
ed, five criteria must be met: (1) evidence 
must be in fact newly discovered, that is, 
discovered since the trial; (2) facts must be 
alleged from which court may infer dili-
gence on part of movant; (3) evidence re-
lied upon must not be merely cumulative or 
impeaching; (4) it must be material to the 
issues involved; and (5) it must be of such 
nature that, on a new trial, the newly dis-
covered evidence would probably produce 
acquittal. 
en 
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L Criminal Law *=»938(1), 1156(3) 
Motions for a new trial on ground of 
wly discovered evidence are looked upon 
th disfavor, and Court of Appeals will not 
erturn trial court's decision with regard 
such a motion absent a clear abuse of 
tcretion. 
. Criminal Law *=» 938(2) 
Fact that codefendants in prosecution 
r false entry on bank records/mail and 
re fraud, and conspiracy, agreed after tri-
to give information to Government in 
change for more lenient sentence did not 
nstitute newly discovered evidence enti-
ng defendant to a new trial, notwith-
mding defendant's contention that code-
fidants would not now try to implicate 
n in their crime and that their testimony 
>uld be much more credible since, follow-
r. their agreement, they would be on 
vemment's side. 
Criminal Law *= 632(4) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
refusing to rule in advance on motion in 
line requesting that Government not be 
owed to broach a second indictment of 
fendant in cross-examination of acquitted 
lefendant who defendant wished to call 
testify for the defense. 
fames M. Rosenbaum, U.S. Atty., Doug* 
A. Kelley, Asst. U.S. Atty., Dist. of 
nn., Minneapolis, Minn., James L. For* 
n, Legal Intern, for appellee. 
Terence P. Durkin, Dudley & Smith, St. 
til, Minn., Albert J. Krieger, Susan W. 
n Dusen, Albert J. Krieger, P.A., Miami, 
i., for appellant Deil Otto Gustafson. 
Jefore HEANEY, ROSS and FAGG, Cir-
t Judges. 
.OSS, Circuit Judge. 
)n November 5, 1981, defendants Agosto, 
stafson, Newstrum, Bruins, Bacigalupo 
The Honorable Edward J Devui, Senior 
udge, United States District Court for the Dis-
ict of Minnesota. 
and Norris were named in a 31 count indict-
ment that charged violations of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1005 (false entry on bank records), 1341 
(mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud), and 371 
(conspiracy). Newstrum agreed, pursuant 
to a plea bargain, to plead to one count of 
mail fraud and testify on behalf of the 
^ government. A jury trial began in United 
States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota' on January 3, 1981. On Janu-
ary 14, the court granted judgments of 
acquittal to defendants Bacigalupo and 
Norris. On January 23, the jury returned 
its verdict: Agosto was convicted on all 
counts; Gustafson was convicted on all 
counts; and Bruins was convicted of 11 
counts. » n May 3, the district court im-
posed the following sentences: Agosto re-
ceived 20 years and a $63,000 fine; Gustaf-
son received 10 years and an $81,000 fine; 
and Bruins received 3 years and a $20,000 
fine. Costs were imposed against Agosto 
and Gustafson. On August 29, 1983, de-
fendant Agosto died of a heart attack. 
On appeal, defendants Bruins and Gus-
tafson raise the following issues: 1) wheth-
er government exhibit 500 was improperly 
admitted under rule 404(b); 2) whether the 
trial court erred in denying Bruins' motion 
for a new trial; and 3) whether the trial 
court erred in refusing to rule on Gustaf-
son's motion in limine to restrict the 
government's cross-examination of Baciga-
lupo.2 For the reasons discussed herein, we 
affirm. 
/. General Background 
Defendant Gustafson, during the relevant 
time period, owned 20 percent of the Tropi-
cana Hotel and Casino. Gustafson also 
owned the Summit National Bank of Saint 
Paul, Summit State Bank of Richfield, 
Summit State Bank of Phalen Park, Sum-
mit State Bank of South Saint Paul, and 
Summit State Bank of Bloomington. De-
fendant Newstrum was Gustafson's "right-
2. Prior to oral argument. Gustalson moved to 
strike the affidavit of Michael Ferrence. Jr., 
from the record As it appears that this affida-
vit was never presented to the trial court, the 
motion to strike is granted 
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hand man" in the operation of the various tafson owned Marlee, Inc. 
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corporations. Defendant Agosto was the 
owner of Production and Leasing (P & L), a 
Nevada corporation, which provided the Fo-
lies Bergere floor show to the Tropicana for 
the sum of $60,000 per week. Defendant 
Norris was employed by Agosto at P & L as 
an administrative secretary. Defendant 
Bruins was the president of the Summit 
Bank of Richfield and acted as a consultant 
to the Summit National Bank. Defendant 
Bacigalupo was the vice president and cash-
ier at the Summit National Bank and per-
sonally handled the Tropicana and P A L 
accounts at that bank. 
The subject of this criminal prosecution 
was a check floating scheme which was 
conducted to fraudulently assist the Tropi-
cana and P & L's financial position by pro-
viding interest-free loans to both enterpris-
es by the Summit Banks of Saint Paul and 
Richfield during the years of 1977 and 1978. 
The Tropicana obtained an improper loan 
from the Summit Bank of Saint Paul by 
using the bank as its depository bank for 
Tropicana employees' federal withholding 
taxes. P & L obtained its loans by using 
two Summit banks as its depository for 
federal withholding taxes and by opening 
commercial checking accounts at both 
banks. The Tropicana and P & L made 
deposits to these accounts in the form of 
nonsufficient fund (NSF) checks. The 
banks treated these as cash (collected) items 
and used bank funds to pay Tropicana and 
P & L obligations. When the checks were 
returned as dishonored, the banks would 
accept new NSF checks to replace them. 
This process would continue until the de-
fendants decided to pay with "good" checks. 
In order to conceal this "float" scheme, 
officers of both banks had to make false 
entries on the books to avoid arousing the 
suspicions of bank examiners. This scheme 
allowed the Tropicana and P & L to contin-
ue day-to-day operations in spite of severe 
cash flow shortages. 
During the trial, the government produc-
ed evidence that Marlee, Inc., a Nevada 
corporation that owned the Gamblers Hall 
of Fame casino, opened a checking account 
at Summit Richfield in July of 1975. Gus-
The opening 
deposit was a $300,000 personal check of Ed 
Legg drawn on a Las Vegas bank. Prior to 
collection, the bank had paid $169,000 of 
checks written on the account. The Legg 
check was not collected as payment was 
stopped, thus, a $169,000 overdraft was cre-
ated in the account. Two days later, Gus-
tafson deposited a check drawn on an Ethi-
opian bank which was valued at approxi-
mately $300,000. The item was sent to a 
Minneapolis bank for collection. However, 
on the same day, Summit Richfield gave the 
Marlee account a $300,000 credit which cov-
ered the overdraft. On September 16,1975, 
the foreign check was still uncollected and 
Gustafson assured the board of directors 
that he would personally pay the overdraft 
by September 30 if the check did not clear. 
The overdraft was paid by Gustafson on 
that date. 
After the bank was examined in 1975, 
Chief Examiner Joseph Yogel wrote a letter 
to the board of directors at Summit Rich-
field dated December 1, 1975. The letter 
characterized the Marlee transaction as a 
"direct misapplication of bank funds" with 
attendant "fictitious entries" on the bank's 
books. It named Gustafson, Newstrum, 
and Bruins as the persons responsible and 
stated that reports had been submitted to 
the United States attorney and the FBI. 
Bruins responded to the letter and indicated 
that he and Gustafson were concerned but 
felt that they handled the situation proper-
ly. No charges were filed. The Vogel let-
ter, government exhibit 500, was introduced 
at trial as evidence which tended to show 
the defendants had knowledge and notice 
that suspicious "floating" activity had oc-
curred at the bank and was deemed a mis-
application of funds by the bank examiners. 
The testimony of trial witnesses estab-
lished that by the spring of 1978, there were 
so many checks and replacement checks in 
the clearing process that the handling of 
such checks became almost impossible. 
Agosto ordered his people to consolidate 17 
Tropicana checks into two checks, payable 
to P & L, in the amounts of $660,000 and 
$360,000, respectively. These checks were 
r^  
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deposited into the P & L account at Summit 
Richfield. When these checks were dishon-
ored by the Valley Bank of Nevada, the 
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis, 
Summit Richfield's correspondent bank, be-
came quite alarmed. By May 16, 1978, the 
Marquette Bank had refused to extend pro-
visional credit to Summit until those depos-
its had been collected. 
This precipitated a crisis for the Summit 
Banks and led to what was labeled the 
'Jane Lannin Affair^ at trial. Bruins tele-
phoned Gustafson to inform him of the 
problem created by the Marquette Bank, 
justafson summoned Newstrum and put 
Bruins' call on a speaker phone. Bruins 
suggested that the Tropicana open new ac-
counts at other Summit Banks which did 
lot clear through the Marquette Bank. 
Newstrum was ordered to call Las Vegas 
md have blank Tropicana checks sent to 
Minnesota and delivered to Bruins. Newst-
•um called Jane Lannin and told her to 
irive to the Minneapolis Airport, pick up a 
(peed pack from the Tropicana, deliver it to 
Bruins and await further instructions. 
When Lannin arrived at the bank, Bruins 
nstructed her to open new accounts at two 
)ther Summit Banks in the name of Hotel 
Conquistador, Inc. When Lannin opened 
the new accounts, she drew checks payable 
.o Summit National as directed by Bruins. 
The plan never achieved its desired effect 
because the bank examiners entered the 
sank before the checks could be presented 
for collection. Newstrum testified that 
justafson told him to lie to the FBI about 
Lhe "Jane Lannin Affair" and to shift the 
•esponsibility from Minnesota to the people 
n Las Vegas. 
On Monday, May 22, 1978, the federal 
>ank examiners entered Summit National 
ind Summit Richfield and discovered that 
52,400,000 worth of checks were in float. 
Since this exceeded the capital of the bank, 
here was concern that the bank would fail, 
justafson borrowed $1,500,000 from a local 
I. Rule 404(b) reads as follows: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show that he acted in conformity 
bank to pay off floating checks. Agosto, 
through wire transfers, was able to pay off 
all but $220,000 at Summit National and 
$141,000 at Summit Richfield. 
It appears that after the above payments 
were made, Gustafson and Bacigalupo set 
about to try to cover the remaining defi-
ciency. On June 21, 1978, two miscellane-
ous credit slips to the P & L account were 
filed showing cash deposits of $110,000 and 
$109,000, respectively. These slips bore the 
initials of Bacigalupo as the responsible 
bank official. No currency transaction re-
ports were filed. Furthermore, suspicious 
loans had been made earlier in the same 
day. These transactions are the subject of 
a seconir* indictment in which Bacigalupo 
and Gustafson were charged with failure to 
file currency reports and for false entries 
on bank books. That case had not been 
tried prior to the trial of the instant case. 
//. Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or 
Acts 
Government exhibit 500, the letter of 
Chief Bank Examiner Vogel, was admitted 
into evidence and went to the jury. Appel-
lants assert that the admission of such evi-
dence was an abuse of Rule 404(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.1 Appellants 
contend that the government introduced 
this evidence to show that they had a pro-
pensity towards criminal behavior. Under 
Rule 404(b), such evidence is not admissible 
to prove the bad character of the defend-
ant, but may be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, knowledge, 
or intent. United States v. Goehring, 585 
F.2d 371, 372 (8th Cir.1978). 
[1-3] The standards in this circuit for 
the admission of other wrongs or acts evi-
dence for such purposes are well estab-
lished: 
Our cases reveal certain requirements 
which must be met for other crimes evi-
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent. 
UNITED STATES 
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dence to be admissible under the rule: (1) 
a material issue on which other crimes 
evidence may be admissible has been 
raised, e.g., United States v. Drury, 582 
F.2d 1181, 1184 (8th Cir.1978); United 
States v. Maestas, 554 F.2d 834, 837 (8th 
Cir.), cert denied, 431 U.S. 972, 97 S.Ct. 
2936,53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977); (2) the prof-
fered evidence is relevant to that issue, 
ibid.; (3) the evidence of the other crimes 
is clear and convincing, e.g., United 
States v. Cobb, 588 F.2d 607, 612 (8th 
Cir.1978), cert, denied, [440 U.S. 947], 99 
S.Ct 1426, 59 L.Ed.2d 636 (1979); United 
States v. Drury, supra, 582 F.2d at 1184; 
United States v. Davis, 551 F.2d 233, 234 
(8th Cir.), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 923, 97 
S.Ct 2197, 53 L.Ed.2d 237 (1977). In 
addition, to be admissible on such issues 
as intent, knowledge, or plan, the other 
crimes evidence must relate to wrongdo-
ing "similar in kind and reasonably close 
in time to the charge at trial." United 
States v. Drury, supra, 582 F.2d at 1184. 
See, e.g., United States v. Little, 562 F.2d 
578, 581 (8th Cir.1977); United States v. 
Jardan, 552 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 433 U.S. 912, 97 S.Ct. 2982, 53 
L.Ed.2d 1097 (1977). Finally, evidence 
otherwise admissible under Rule 404(b) 
may be excluded under Fed.REvid. 403, 
"if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prej-
udice • • V 
United States v. Burchinal, 657 F.2d 985, 
993 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1086, 
102 S.Ct 646, 70 L.Ed.2d 622 (1981) quoting 
United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 
1358, 1365 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 
934, 100 S.Ct 281, 62 L.Ed.2d 193 (1979). 
[4,5] Rule 404(b) is one of inclusion be-
cause it allows the admission of evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts relevant to an 
issue in the trial, unless it tends only to 
prove criminal disposition. United States v. 
Wagoner, 713 F.2d 1371,1375 (8th Cir.1983). 
The trial court is vested with broad discre-
tion in deciding whether to admit wrongful 
act evidence. United States v. Evans, 697 
F.2d 240, 248 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, — 
U.S. , 103 S.Ct 1779, 76 L.Ed.2d 352 
(1983). The decision to admit such evidence 
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will only be reversed when it is clear that 
the questioned evidence has no bearing 
upon any of the issues involved at trial. 
United States v. Marshall, 683 F.2d 1212, 
1215 (8th Cir.1982). 
[6,7] In the present case, we find that 
all of the standards for admission were met; 
thus, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion. At trial, a material issue on which 
evidence of other acts may be admissible 
was raised when the appellants' defense 
consisted of claiming they were innocent 
because they relied on their subordinates to 
handle these day-to-day transactions. Fur-
thermore, government exhibit 500 is rele-
vant to that issue. Evidence is relevant 
when it serves to rebut a defense that a 
person had justifiably relied upon subordi-
nates to handle business matters. See 
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 678, 95 
S.Ct 1903, 1914, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975). 
[8-10] We also find that the evidence of 
other acts was clear and convincing. To 
meet the clear and convincing standard, the 
proffered evidence cannot be admitted if it 
is of vague and uncertain character. Unit- JJJ 
ed States v. demons, 503 F.2d 486, 490 (8th 
Cir.1974). Furthermore, the prior conduct 
cannot be equally consistent with an inno-
cent explanation. Id. The uncontradicted 
evidence showed that the Ethiopian check 
was treated as a cash item and credited to 
Gustafson's account on the same day it was 
sent to Minneapolis for collection. Addi-
tional checks were then written on the ac-
count after it was given credit and prior to 
collection. We find it clear that an improp-
er "float" occurred due to the bank giving 
credit to Gustaf son's account. Under this 
same analysis, we find that the evidence 
related to wrongdoing similar in kind and 
reasonably close in time to the charge at 
trial. 
[11] Finally, we find that the evidence 
was properly admitted because its probative 
value was substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. This court 
would find it quite difficult to rule that the 
admission of government exhibit 500 caused 
the appellants to be convicted on an im-
oo 
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proper basis. Moreover, the trial court 
gave a limiting instruction telling the jury 
not to consider such evidence as substantive 
proof but only as proof of notice or knowl-
edge of a prior incident. Such an instruc-
tion diminishes the danger of any unfair 
prejudice arising from the admission of evi-
dence of other acts. United States v. 
Goehring, supra, 585 F.2d at 373. 
/ / / . Bruins' Motion for a New *Trial 
Bruins asserts ttyat "because Gustafson 
and Agosto agreed, after trial, to give in-
formation to the government in exchange 
for a more lenient sentence, newly discover-
ed evidence now exists that would justify 
granting him a new trial. Bruins submits 
that now Gustafson and Agosto would not 
try to implicate him in their crime and their 
testimony would be much more credible as 
they are now "on the government's side." 
Bruins argues that since this was unavaila-
ble during the first trial, it constitutes new-
ly discovered evidence. 
[12,13] This court has set forth the cri-
teria for granting a motion for a new trial 
on the ground of newly discovered evidence 
on numerous occasions. Before such a mo-
tion can be granted, the following five cri-
teria must be met: 
(1) the evidence must be in fact newly 
discovered, that is, discovered since the 
trial; (2) facts must be alleged from 
which the court may infer diligence on 
the part of the movant; (3) the evidence 
relied upon must not be merely cumula-
tive or impeaching; (4) it must be materi-
al to the issues involved; and (5) it must 
be of such nature that, on a new trial, the 
newly discovered evidence would proba-
bly produce an acquittal. 
United States v. Swarek, 677 F.2d 41, 43 
(8th Cir.1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1102, 
103 S.Ct. 723, 74 L.Ed.2d 949 (1983). It is 
also well settled that such motions are 
looked upon with disfavor and we will not 
overturn the trial court's decision absent a 
clear abuse of discretion United States v. 
Pope, 415 F.2d 685 (8th Cir.1969), cert, de-
nied, 397 U.S. 950, 90 S.Ct. 973, 25 L.Ed.2d 
132 (1970). 
[14] We find that the showing made in 
support of the motion for new trial does not 
satisfy the criteria set out in Swarek. The 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the motion. 
IV. Gustafson's Motion in Limine 
[15] At the close of the government's 
case, the court granted a judgment of ac-
quittal to Bacigalupo. As he was available 
as a witness, Gustafson announced his in-
tention to call Bacigalupo to testify for the 
defense. The government advised that, if 
Bacigalupo was called, its cross-examination 
would include the subject matter of the 
second indictment pending against Baciga-
lupo ana Gustafson. Gustafson made a mo-
tion in limine requesting that the govern-
ment not be allowed to broach the second 
indictment in cross-examination. The trial 
court refused to rule in advance on the 
motion and Gustafson chose not to call Ba-
cigalupo to the stand. 
Gustafson asserts that this court's deci-
sion in United States v. Burkhead, 646 F.2d 
1283 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 898, 
102 S.Ct. 399,70 L.Ed.2d 214 (1981), compels 
a finding of reversible error. We disagree. 
In Burkhead, the court found reversible er-
ror when a trial court failed to rule in 
advance on whether a defendant could be 
cross-examined regarding events underly-
ing his conviction on severed substantive 
counts as it was determinative of his desire 
to take the stand. We find that Gustaf-
son's reliance on Burkhead is misplaced. 
The court in Burkhead held that in the 
usual case the judge has discretion to refuse 
to rule in advance, however, this case was 
so outside the ordinary that a refusal to 
rule in advance on a matter determinative 
of the defendant's desire to take the stand 
constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at 
1285. Thus, Burkhead is the exception and 
the instant case is covered by the general 
rule. The court did not abuse its discretion. 
V. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the convictions 
are affirmed. 
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Church brought wrongful levy action 
arising from seizure of property by the In-
ternal Revenue Service. The United States 
District Court for the District of South 
Dakota, John B. Jones, J., 556 F.Supp. 688, 
entered judgment, and church appealed. 
The Court of Appeals held that property 
held in name of church could be levied on to 
satisfy tax liabilities of individual taxpayers 
who had set up the church. 
Affirmed. 
Internal Revenue *»4857 
Taxpayers fraudulently conveyed prop-
erty to a church to avoid federal tax lien 
and church was alter ego of the taxpayers, 
who were fully supported by funds and 
property of the church they created in 
whatever style they themselves chose; thus, 
property held in name of church could be 
levied on to satisfy individual taxpayers' 
tax liabilities. 
Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Michael L. Paup, Gary R. Allen, Stanley S. 
Shaw, Jr., Tax Div., Dept of Justice, Wash-
ington, D.C., for appellees; Philip N. Ho-
1. The Honorable John B. Jones, United States 
District Court, District of South Dakota, South-
Before HEANEY, ROSS and FAGG, Cir-
cuit Judges. 
PER CURIAM. 
The Internal Revenue Service levied upon 
and seized a building in Huron, South Dako-
ta; a 40-acre tract of farmland; three mo-
tor vehicles and two bank accounts in con-
nection with the federal income tax liability 
of Dr. Albert A. Anderson and Myrtle G. 
Anderson. Title to all the property was 
held by the plaintiff, Loving Saviour 
Church, an unincorporated association. The 
bank accounts were in the name of Loving 
Saviour Church and the Anderson Business 
Trust. This action for a preliminary injunc-
tion to secure the release of the property 
and for damages resulting from the levy 
was brought under 26 U.S.C. § 7426. Lov-
ing Saviour Church appeals from an ad* 
verse decision in the district court1 which 
held that the IRS properly levied upon the 
property to satisfy the Andersons' tax lia-
bilities. 
Background 
In 1975 the Andersons purchased some 
trust forms from a person involved in the 
tax protest movement, set up the A & M 
Family Trust, and transferred all their 
property to the trust In 1976, a new A k 
M Family Trust and an Anderson Business 
Trust were set up to replace the 1975 trust. 
In 1977 the Andersons received Doctor of 
Divinity degrees from the Life Science 
Church and set up their own church which 
later became the Loving Saviour Church. 
After taking a vow of poverty, Dr. An-
derson transferred all the property from 
the A & M Family Trust and the Anderson 
Business Trust to the church for no consid-
ern Division. 
ON 
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ble from this case on its facts. There the 
Post's story was based almost entirely on a 
source previously unknown to the defend-
ants, whom they knew to have a criminal 
record. Obvious avenues for checking the 
facts and allegations in the story were ig-
nored, even though the editors had actual 
warning that much of it was false. The 
critical difference in this case is that Brooks 
relied on two reputable sources, and there 
was nothing to indicate to him that their 
information, or his synthesis of it, was not 
wholly accurate. Moreover, his reason for 
including the sentence about Ryan was his 
desire to make the book a balanced, objec-
tive history of AT&T. Certainly the South-
ern Bell controversy was worthy of mention 
in a history of the telephone company, and 
a rule of liability that could cause authors 
to avoid such controversial topics for fear of 
damage judgments would ultimately reduce 
the flow of information to the public 
Our reading of this case is fully in line 
with the decisions in other circuits that 
have applied the New York Times standard. 
As long as the sources of the libelous infor-
mation appeared reliable, and the defend-
ant had no doubts about its accuracy, the 
courts have held the evidence of malice 
insufficient to support a jury verdict, even 
if a more thorough investigation might 
have prevented the admitted error. See 
Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1227 (3d 
Cir. 1978); Holchncr v. Castillo-Puche, 661 
F.2d 910, 912-14 (2d Cir. 1977); Grzelak v. 
Calumet Publishing Co.$ 543 F.2d 579, 583 
(7th Cir. 1975); Vandenburg v. Newsweek, 
tiff, included evidence that the defendant had 
described the plaintiffs appearance and ex-
pression, and had quoted her in his article even 
though she clearly was not at home when he 
visited. Id. at 253. 95 S.Ct. at 470. 
•. The court's instructions on actual malice 
were as follows: 
The courts have set out this standard in 
various ways; that is, they have defined it 
some ten or twelve years ago, the first time 
the Supreme Court dealt expressly with this 
problem. They defined actual malice as pub-
lication with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not. In other cases, it's been referred 
to as highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards 
507 F.2d at 1026-28; Drotzmann's, Inc. v. 
McGraw-Hill Inc., 500 F.2d 830, 834 (8th 
Cir. 1974). In two cases in which the evi-
dence of malice was found to be sufficient, 
by contrast, the facts indicated strongly 
that the challenged allegations had been 
completely fabricated by the writer. See 
Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206,213 
(7th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 
731, 735-36 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
The trial court below submitted this case 
to the jury with the instruction that they 
must find the element of actual malice on 
the part of defendants in order to find them 
liable. The court's definition of malice, 
however, was too broad, in that it included 
Justice Harlan's standard from Butts, 
which has since been rejected by a majority 
of the Court, and which may have confused 
the jury by indicating that a finding of 
negligence would suffice for malice.9 De-
fendants, however, did not object to the 
inclusion of this definition. They did re-
quest the court, after it had finished the 
instructions but before the jury retired, to 
reopen the instructions and include the lan-
guage of the St. Amant case, which the 
court refused. Though we do not say it 
was error for the court to refuse to include 
this belated offering, we disagree with its 
conclusion that the St. Amant language 
would be inappropriate to the circumstances 
of this case. The St. Amant language has 
been cited frequently in subsequent deci-
sions of the Court, including very recent 
ones," and it has never been limited to suits 
brought by public officials. 
of investigative reporting ordinarily adhered 
to by responsible publishers. In another 
case, it was said there must be sufficient 
evidence to permit the conclusion that the 
defendant, in fact, entertained serious doubts 
as to the truth of his publication. In another 
it was referred to as knowing falsehood or 
reckless disregard of the truth, and then I 
believe the most recent case, which is now 
several years old, the Court again stated the 
original proposition that publication with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not. 
10. See Herbert v. Undo, 441 U.S. 153. 156, 99 
S.Ct 1635. 1638. 60 L Ed.2d 115 (1979); Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. at 332, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 
3003. 41 L.Ed.2d 789. 
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We need not decide, however, whether 
the instructions were so prejudicial as to 
constitute "plain error" and a basis for re-
versal. The defendants have properly chal-
lenged the sufficiency of the evidence, and 
on that basis we have followed the Supreme 
Court's lead in First Amendment cases and 
have conducted an independent examina-
tion of the record as a whole to determine 
whether the judgment constitutes "a for-
bidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion." Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 
389 U.S. 81, 82, 88 S.Ct. 197, 198-199, 19 
L.Ed.2d 248 (1967). We find the evidence 
of actual malice insufficient to present a 
jury question in light of the constitutional 
standard, and we therefore reverse. 
REVERSED. 
WIDENER, Circuit Judge, concurs in the 
result 
|wttHU*Bl«StSUII> 
5 jvvv**•'^<rf"y 
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, 
v. 
Eileen Eldorado JOHNSON, Appellant 
No. 79-5272. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fourth Circuit 
Argued Aug. 19, 1980. 
Decided Nov. 12, 1980. 
A medical doctor was convicted of fed-
eral income tax evasion, and new trial was 
denied by the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Virginia at 
Lynchburg, James C. Turk, Chief Judge. 
Defendant appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, James Dickson Phillips, Circuit 
Judge, held that where defendant at trial 
claimed inadvertence, claiming she had had 
nothing to do with preparing her tax re-
turns because she cared nothing for money 
and chose, instead, to devote her time to 
demanding personal needs of her patients, 
testimony of auditor for United States De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare 
that defendant in billing for medicaid serv-
ices reported four times as many services 
per patient as other Virginia doctors was 
admissible under rule providing for admissi-
bility of evidence of other crimes, etc., to 
prove preparation, plan, knowledge, absence 
of mistake or accident, etc. 
Affirmed. 
Widener, Circuit Judge, dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Criminal Law «»370, 372(14) 
In prosecution for federal income tax 
evasion wherein defendant at trial claimed 
inadvertence, claiming she had nothing to 
do with preparing her tax returns because 
she cared nothing for money and chose, 
instead, to devote her time to demanding 
personal needs of her patients, testimony of 
auditor for United States Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare that de-
fendant in billing for medicaid services re-
ported four times as many services per pa-
tient as other Virginia doctors was admissi-
ble under rule providing for admissibility of 
evidence of other crimes, etc., to prove 
preparation, plan, knowledge, absence of 
mistake or accident etc. 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 7201; Fed.Rules Evid. Rule 404(b), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
1 Criminal Law *=»369.1 
First sentence of rule concerning ad-
missibility of evidence of other crimes, etc., 
brings forward traditional rule that extrin-
sic acts evidence is inadmissible solely to 
prove that defendant is of bad character 
and therefore likely to have committed 
crime charged. Fed.Rules Evid. Rule 
404(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Criminal Law *=>369.2(1) 
Extrinsic acts evidence may be admissi-
ble for other purposes than those listed in 
rule concerning admissibility of such evi-
dence, list provided by the rule being mere-
ly illustrative and not exclusive. Fed.Rules 
Evid. Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
O 
736 634 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
4. Criminal Law *=> 371(12) 
In determining whether extrinsic act 
evidence should be admitted to prove mo-
tive, etc.. under rule, trial judge must first 
determine if proffered evidence is relevant 
to issue other than accused's character, and, 
if so, trial judge must balance probative 
value of such evidence against dangers of 
undue prejudice aroused by such form of 
evidence. Ped.Rules Evid. Rule 404(b), 28 
U.S.C.A. 
5. Criminal Law <*=>369.I 
Prohibition of rule that evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove character of person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith 
is designed to prevent prosecutorial over-
reaching by means so obviously effective 
that it has been inescapable temptation for 
advocates over the years. Fed.Rules Evid. 
Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
6. Criminal Law *=»371(1) 
Where a defendant has deliberately 
sought as primary means of defense to de-
pict herself as one whose essential philoso-
phy and habitual conduct in life is com-
pletely at odds with possession of state of 
mind requisite to guilt of offense charged, 
defendant may be considered in effect to 
have forfeited any protection afforded by 
rule against some types of "other act" evi-
dence. Ped.Rules Evid. Rule 404(b), 28 U.S. 
C.A. 
7. Criminal Law *»730(1) 
In prosecution for income tax evasion, 
government counsel's unfortunate reference 
to defendant's use of "fraudulent" medicaid 
forms was sufficiently corrected by caution-
ary actions that risk of prejudice was ade-
quately removed. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201; Fed. 
Rules Evid. Rule 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A. 
S. W. Tucker, Richmond, Va. (Hill, Tuck-
er & Marsh, Richmond, Va., J. Hugo Madi-
son, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellant 
John S. Edwards, U. S. Atty., Roanoke, 
Va. (Faye S. Ehrenstamm, Asst U. S. Atty., 
Roanoke, Va., on brief), for appellee. 
Before RUSSELL, WIDENER and 
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 
JAMES DICKSON PHILLIPS, Circuit 
Judge: 
Convicted by a jury of federal income tax 
evasion under 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201, Eileen 
Eldorado Johnson unsuccessfully moved in 
the district court for a new trial, on the 
grounds that evidence of her overstated 
Medicaid billings was improperly admitted 
and that government counsel's reference to 
her "fraudulent" Medicaid forms unduly 
prejudiced the jury. We affirm, holding 
that the extrinsic acts evidence was proper-
ly admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and 
that no prejudice resulted from the "fraud-
ulent" reference in view of the trial court's 
corrective action. 
I 
Johnson is a medical doctor, who inherit-
ed her practice from her deceased brother. 
She filed tax returns for 1972, 1973, and 
1974, which understated her income by ap-
proximately $120,000.00 and her tax liabili-
ty by approximately $31,000.00. Her de-
fense at trial was inadvertence: she had 
had nothing to do with preparing her tax 
returns because she cared nothing for mon-
ey and chose, instead, to devote her time to 
the demanding personal needs of her pa-
tients. To support this defense she produc-
ed seven local witnesses-three physicians, a 
school board member, a public school teach-
er, a mortician, and a minister-who testi-
fied to her truthfulness, honesty, and com-
passion, and to the busy nature of her prac-
tice. 
In attempted rebuttal of this portrait of 
Johnson as an altruistic healer of the sick, 
whose concerns lay elsewhere than attend-
ing to her financial interests and resulting 
legal responsibilities, the government called 
Robert Pemberton, an auditor for the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education & Wel-
fare. Pemberton testified at length about 
his investigation of Johnson's billings for 
Medicaid services for 1976-78. His study 
showed that Johnson reported four times as 
many services per patient as other Virginia 
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doctors. Johnson did not object to the gen-
eral course of Pemberton's testimony. In 
fact, the following day Johnson again took 
the stand in order to testify that she had 
not signed the Medicaid billings upon which 
Pemberton had based his investigation. 
During cross-examination, government 
counsel asked Johnson, "Who would have 
received the benefit of all the fraudulent 
forms for Medicaid that were filed?" John-
son's counsel objected and moved for a mis-
trial because use of the term, "fraudulent," 
unduly prejudiced the jury. The trial judge 
overruled the motion, directed government 
counsel to rephrase the question, and gave 
the jury a cautionary instruction. 
II 
f l ] We hold that Pemberton's testimony 
was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), 
which provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acta 
is not admissible to prove the character of 
a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
[2,3] The first sentence of Rule 404(b) 
brings forward the traditional rule that ex-
trinsic acts evidence is inadmissible solely to 
prove that defendant is a bad character 
and. therefore, likely to have committed the 
crime charged. See, e.g., Michelson v. Unit-
ed States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 
L.Ed. 168 (1948); United States v. Woods, 
484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973); Lovely v. 
United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948); 
Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Evid. 
404(b); McCormick, Evidence § 190, at 447 
(2d ed. 1972). Extrinsic acts evidence, how-
ever, may be admissible for other purposes 
including those listed in Rule 404(b). The 
Rule's list is merely illustrative, not exclu-
sive. Wright & Graham, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Evidence § 5240, at 469 
(1978). 
[4] Rule 404(b) of course commits to 
trial judge discretion the determination 
whether extrinsic act evidence shall be ad-
mitted under its second sentence. In exer-
cising that discretion the judge first must 
determine if the proffered evidence is rele-
vant to an issue other than the accused's 
character. If so, then the trial judge must 
balance the evidence's probative value 
against the dangers of undue prejudice 
aroused by this form of evidence. This may 
co needed I y pose particularly difficult prob-
lems. The Advisory Committee Notes to 
Rule 404(b) state: 
No mechanical solution is offered. The 
determination must be made whether the 
danger of undue prejudice outweighs the 
probative value of the availability of oth-
er means of proof and other factors ap-
propriate for making decisions of this 
kind under Rule 403 [confusion of issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, waste 
of time, and needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence]. 
[5] Within this general guideline for the 
exercise of trial court discretion, we think 
the evidence here challenged was properly 
admitted. The general prohibition con-
tained in the first sentence of Rule 404(b) is 
designed to prevent prosecutorial over-
reaching by a means whose obvious effec-
tiveness has made it an inescapable tempta-
tion for advocates over the years. The 
second sentence, however, reflects the per-
ception that evidence of "other acts" may 
sometimes be critical to proof on a disposi-
tive issue related to a defendant's state of 
mind. The ambivalence reflected in the 
Rule but serves to emphasize the particular 
delicacy of the discretionary rulings its ad-
ministration may require. There is no gain-
saying that the ruling here posed just such 
a problem for the trial judge, but we think 
he properly resolved it. 
[6] Particularly where, as here, a de-
fendant in a criminal case by her own testi-
mony and that of others has deliberately 
sought as the primary means of defense to 
depict herself as one whose essential philos-
ophy and habitual conduct in life is com-
pletely at odds with the possession of a 
state of mind requisite to guilt of the of-
fense charged, that defendant may be con-
sidered in effect to have forfeited any pro-
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tection that the first sentence of the Rule 
might otherwise have provided against the 
type of "other act" evidence here chal-
lenged. See Waider v. United States, 347 
U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 LEd. 503 (1954). 
In such circumstances, testimony such as 
that of Pemberton may well be the only 
effective way to rebut evidence designed 
generally to plant in the jury's mind a 
reasonable doubt that such a person could 
have possessed the culpability of mind req-
uisite to convict of the crime charged. Bal-
ancing the probative value of the chal-
lenged evidence against its potential for 
unfairly prejudicing the defendant, and on 
the latter point taking into account that the 
defendant deliberately chose to base her 
defense upon evidence not otherwise effec-
tively rebuttable, we conclude that the dis-
trict judge's admission of Pemberton's evi-
dence lay well within the bounds of the 
discretion reposed in him. 
HI 
[7] We think that government counsel'! 
unfortunate reference to "fraudulent" Med* 
icaid forms was sufficiently corrected by 
the trial judge's cautionary actions so that 
the risk of prejudice was adequately re-
moved. 
Finding no merit in the defendant's other 
contentions, we affirm. 
AFFIRMED. 
WIDENER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent and would grant a 
new trial. 
Assuming that the evidence of other acts 
is admissible for one purpose or another, 
and I think, after United States v. Woods, 
484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), even taking 
into consideration the later advent of the 
new rules, the admissibility of such evi-
dence is pretty well entrusted in this circuit 
to the almost uncontrolled discretion of the 
trial judge, Pemberton's most damning tes-
timony is not considered by the majority in 
its opinion. 
Pemberton testified that Dr. Johnson had 
billed for specific services not rendered, and 
he ascertained that fact by asking the pa-
tients involved. Thus, the false billing he 1 
concluded Dr. Johnson had done was proved 
by statements other than those made by the 
declarant while testifying at a trial or hear-
ing and offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. This is hear-
say pure and simple under FRE 801(c) and 
inadmissible under FRE 802, for it is not 
subject to any exception as to which I am 
advised. 
An example follows: 
"THE COURT: 
Q. And then you checked with some of 
the patients? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And found out that the services were 
not rendered? 
A. In talking with the recipients, they 
stated that they had not received 
certain services which were billed by 
Dr. Johnson." 
Specific instances of conduct, whether of-
fered to rebut a defense to the merits, as 
the majority treats it, or whether offered to 
rebut a defense of good character, I think 
may no more be proved by hearsay than 
any other essential fact in the case. 
The testimony I have quoted is only a 
part of that introduced; other evidence is 
equally as inadmissible. It may only be 
considered highly prejudicial, and its admis-
sion should warrant a new trial. 
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PROCTOR & SCHWARTZ, INC. and 
SCM Corporation, Appellants, 
v. 
C. F. ROLLINS, Appellee. 
No. 79-1876. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fourth Circuit. 
Argued Oct 6, 1980. 
Decided Nov. 13, 1980. 
Georgia resident brought action against 
nnsylvania and New York corporations to 
auftssuFj* ns (isss) 
recover damages for personal injuries sus-
tained. The United States District Court 
for the District of South Carolina, Sol Blatt, 
Jr., J., 478 F.Supp. 1137, denied the corpora-
tions' motions to dismiss and permission to 
appeal was granted. The Court of Appeals, 
Haynsworth, Chief Judge, held that South 
Carolina statute, closing the doors of South 
Carolina's courts for suits involving a for-
eign cause of action brought by a foreign 
plaintiff against a foreign corporation, de-
prived the District Court of jurisdiction 
over the injured Georgia resident's suit, in 
the absence of countervailing affirmative 
federal considerations. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Federal Courts «=»75 
South Carolina statute, closing the 
doors of South Carolina's courts for suits 
involving a foreign cause of action brought 
by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign cor-
poration, deprived federal district court of 
jurisdiction over injured Georgia workman's 
suit against Pennsylvania manufacturer of 
a machine which injured him in Georgia, in 
the absence of countervailing affirmative 
federal considerations. S.C.Code 1976, 
§ 15-5-150. 
2. Federal Courts «=>75 
Plaintiffs failure to timely file suit in 
the more logical, convenient forum did not 
constitute a countervailing consideration fa-
voring exercise of federal jurisdiction in the 
face of statute closing doors of state's 
courts for suits involving a foreign cause of 
action brought by a foreign plaintiff 
against a foreign corporation. S.C.Code 
1976, § 15-5-150. 
John P. Linton, Charleston, S. C. (Sinkler, 
Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, S. C, on brief) 
and Samuel P. Pierce, Jr., Atlanta, Ga. 
(Warner S. Currie, Swift, Currie, McGhee & 
Hiers, Atlanta, Ga., on brief)* for appel-
lants. 
John E. Parker, Ridgeland, S. C. (Peters, 
Murdaugh, Parker, Eltzroth & Detrick, 
Ridgeland, S. C, on brief), for appellee. 
1. Nix v. Mercury Motors Exp. Inc.. 270 S.C 
477. 242 S.E.2d 683 (1979). 
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, 
and BUTZNER and SPROUSE, Circuit 
Judges. 
HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge: 
[1] By permission of this court, Proctor 
& Schwartz, Inc. and SCM Corporation 
prosecute this interlocutory § 1292(b) ap-
peal of the denial of their motions to dis-
miss. Among the grounds asserted for re-
versal, they argue that South Carolina's 
"door closing" statute, S.C.Code § 15-5-
150, deprived the district court of jurisdic-
tion. We agree. 
In 1972, Rollins was injured in an acci-
dent involving a machine manufactured by 
Proctor & Schwartz. Rollins resides in, was 
injured in, and recovered workmen's com-
pensation in Georgia. The allegedly defec-
tive machine was manufactured in Pennsyl-
vania. Proctor & Schwartz, a Pennsylvania 
corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary 
of SCM, a New York corporation. 
Five years after the accident, Rollins sued 
the two foreign corporations in the United 
States District Court for the District of c>i 
South Carolina. South Carolina's relatively ^ 
long six year statute of limitations, rather 
than any nexus with the facts giving rise to 
this cause of action, dictated Rollins' choice 
of forum. By 1977 the Georgia limitations 
period had long since run. 
Section 15 5-150 opens the South Caroli-
na state courts to two types of suits against 
foreign corporations: (1) by any resident 
for any cause of action; and (2) by a non-
resident for any cause of action that arose 
within South Carolina. By implication, and 
by interpretation of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court,1 the statute closes the doors 
of South Carolina's courts for suits, as the 
present one, involving a foreign cause of 
action brought by a foreign plaintiff 
against a foreign corporation. 
In Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 
349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965), this court held 
that a South Carolina federal court exercis-
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